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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF A1fERICA, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 7671

vs.
'

1viARK LEWIS,
Defendant and Respondent ..

BRIEF OF APPELLAN-T
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
This action was filed by the General Insurance Company
of America, hereinafter referred to as "Insurance Company,''
against one Mark Lewis for the recovery of damages arising
from an automobile accident.
\,.

The Insurance Company issued its collision ~olicy ·No.
5967A-3009 to one Samuel P. Park on August 10, 1947, thereby
3
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undertaking to insure Park's 193 7 Studebaker automobile for
a one-year period against such damages as might be caused by
collision for the value of the automobile, less the sum of $50.00
which was the deductible amount to be paid by the said Park
(Plaintiff's Exhibits B and C) .
On the morning of December 22, 1947, Mr. Park left
his home in the company of his son,. Kenneth W. Park, and
a Bill Howell (Tr. 13 and 29), for the purpose of proceeding
to work at the plant of the G~neva Steel Company, located
just west of Orem, Utah (Tr. 10). Mr. Samuel Park was
driving his Studebaker sedan and his son and Mr. Howell were
riding as passengers in the front seat (Tr. 13 and 20). They
proceeded from Provo, Utah, toward the said steel plant along
Highway 114, which is a two-lane roadway, one lane for
northbound traffic and one lane for southbound traffic( Tr.
2, 3 and 10). This highway is an improved hard-surfaced
roadway and runs generally in a north-south direction near
the steel plant (Tr. 3, and 11). It "'as daylight, and visibility
was good. .A light snow was falling ,and the highway was
covered with hard-packed snow, and was icy in spots (Tr. 3,
4, 19 and 25).
At about 8:40 A.M. on this morning, Mr. Park brought
his automobile to a stop, facing North, on said highway at
a point ~pprox~mately one-quarter of a mile South of the
Geneva plant (Tr. 3; 11 and 12 y. There was a line of cars
ahead ·a{ Park's automobile as· there had been an accident further North on the highway (T~.· 11). · He stopped his car on
the·. easterly shoulder of the highway, in line with the other
automobiles ahead, .with the left· wheels of his car about 8
4
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feet to the east of the center of the highway (Tr. 11, 12, 14,
20, 21 and 22). Mr. Park's car was stopped off the highway
Ofl the east shoulder, as far as possible, in view of the snow
piled along the edge thereof (Tr. 7, 20 and 22).
1tir. Park and his t\VO passengers remained seated in the
car and after about four or five minutes, his auton1obile was
struck from the -rear by the defendant, Mark Lewis, driving
his 193 7 Plymouth Sedan automobile_ (Tr. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11,
20 and 24). Immediately before this collision, the defendant
was on his way to work at the Geneva plant and had as passengers in his car, Guy Lewis and Frank Clayson (Tr. 6) .·He
was driving between 15 and 20 miles per hour and his car
was .following about forty feet behind the automobile of one
George Armour (R. 28 and Tr. 4 and 25). Armour brought
his car to a stop behinc;l the Park automobile and when the
defendant applied the brakes on his. car, the sam_e skidded on
the highway, collided with the left side of the Armour vehicle,
and then skidded some 20 additional feet into the rear of the
Park automobile (Tr. 4, 5, 8, 9, 25, 26 and 27). The 1mpact
against the rear of the Park car caused: it to collide· with the
rear of the automobile directly in front of it (Tr. J2, 13 and
21). The impact of the defendant's car with- the rear of the
Park vehicle was sufficiently severe. to- tear loose the· front
seat of the Park vehicle and throw Park and.. his tWo· ·companions into the rear seat (Tr. 12, 13 and 20).
.

I

As a result of this collision, the Park automobile sustained
damages. in the sum of $262.55 (Tr.· 17 and 18-··Plaintiffs
Exhibit A).. -On January 14, 1948, the Insurance·· Companyr
delivered its dr:aft. for. $:212.55 ·to the· said . Sa~ue.l P. Par.k
).
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in reimbursement for the damages, less the sum of $50.00 .paid
by him under the deductible terms of his policy (Tr. 17Plaintiff' s Exhibit B). In exchange for this draft, Park executed and delivered to the Insurance Company a Proof of Loss
which contained a subrogation agreement (Tr. 17 and 18 Plaintiff's Exhibit C). The plaintiff sued defendant under
the subrogation agreement for the amount of the damages to
the Park automobile which it paid by reason of said insurance
policy. The Court entered judgment in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff Insurance ~ompany, no cause of
·action.

STATEMENT OF POI:r\TS
The plaintiff- filed this appeal, and has designated and
included the entire. record, and all the proceedings and evidence in the action, and_ in its apP,eal relie~ upon the following
points:
. _ 1. The Court erred in making and entering Finding of

Fact No. 7 to the effect ((that after· Samuel P. Park stopped
his automobile, he did nothing to warn the defendant or other
drivers--of other automobiles approaching from the South upon
said highway and that by failing to do so, he was guilty of
negligence which contributed to the damages sustained to his
automobile," for the reason that said Finding is contrary to law.
2. The Court further erred in making and entering Findi~

of Fact No. 7 to the effect ((that the said Samuel P. Park failed
to .move !)is car off the road onto the shoulder and parked .in
-6
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the lane of traffic, and that by so doing he was guilty of negligence which contributed to the damages sustained to his automobile,'' on the ground and for the reason that said Finding
is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to law. .
3. That there is no evidence to support the Conclusion
of Law No. 1, and the Judgment of no cause of action is con-

trary to I aw.

AR.GU~fENT

·POINT I
The trial court conclud~d that there ~as ~o question but
what the defendant was negligent in the operation of his.
~utomobile (Finding of Fact No. 6-R. 29) but resolved that
the Plaintiff Insurance Company was not entitled" to ·recove.r
by reason of the contributory negligence of its insured·. Accordingly, the ?nly problem to be disposed of in this ~ppeal is
whether or not from the facts at hand, the acts of the_ plaintiffs
insured constituted contributory negligence.
The ·evidence sho\vs, without dispute or contradiction,
that the insured of the plaintiff Insurance Company, Samuel
P. Park, stopped his automobile directly behind several othe~;
cars and thereafter did nothing to warn other drivers of vehicles approaching from the rear. There was a light "snow
fAlling but all witnesses testified that visibility was .good.. Mr.
Park experienced no difficulty in stopping ·his car ·becaus·e ..of
unusual highway conditions; he· pulled ~off to the.- right as ~far
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as he could do under the circumstances. Did the law require
that he then get out of his vehicle and attemp~ to warn drivers
~ pproaching £rom the rear of a condition that was obviously
apparent to any of such drivers who should have been keeping
a reasonable and proper lookout? We respectfully submit
not. For the law to require that each driver remove himself
from his automob~le and endeavor to warn others approaching
a line of cars from the rear would present an impossible traffic
situation and be a hazard in itself. Such a ruling would
impose a duty upon all drivers traveling upon snow-covered
streets to give warning to any other driver approaching a line
of vehicles from the rear, of the presence of such line of
vehicles whether they be temporarily waiting for a traffic control signal to change from red to green, or for any number
of other reasons which might have required traffic to halt.
Such a requirement would in each instance mean that any
temporary. stopping on the proper side of the roadway for a

necess~~y purpose would be ta~tamount to negligence if the
d~iv~r ~o stopping failed to immediately get out of his vehicle
~nd endeav~r to warn other drivers approaching frogt the.
;ear. ..This we do ~ot. believe ~o be a requirement of th~ law.
. In the case of Reuben E. Caperton v. Ben Mast et al, 85
Cal. App. 2nd 15 7, 192 Pac. 2d 467, the plaintiff had a trailer
.:hitched to the ~ar of his car. He attempted· to turn. ~round
on the open highway at night and his engine stalled causing
the trailer to bl~ck the highway. The defendant was driving
a truck· with the lights· on low beam, failed to ·observe the plaintifFs lrailer, and collided with it and the plaintiff's car. The
court held that the collision was the proximate result of the

s
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negligence· of the defendant, unaided in any degree by an
act or omission of the plaintiff, and awarded damages.
Before the defense of contributory negligence will prove
availing, it must ~e shown that the acts alleged as constituting
such defense directly co1ztributed to the injury.__ 5 American
Jurisprudence, Para. 407, page 739.
The test by which the contributory negligence of a person
injured in an automobile accident is measured is whether he
acted as a reasonably prudent man would have acted u~der
the peculiar circumstances of the case, considering the sur..
rounding hazards and any other f~ctors · explanatory of the
particular situation.

5 American Jurisprudence, Para. 408,

Page 740.

· We believe the case of James E. Smith vs. Clin~q.n Webb,
10 S. E. 2d 503, 131 ALR 5.58, to be in point.

Pl~ihtiff sued

defendants, oyv~ers of a school bus, to. recover for pers~onal
.. injuries ~nd prope~ty damage sustained in a collision be~·.

a school bus and a

pick-~p tr~k dri~en by plai~tiff as '! result

of the plaintiff driving into. the rear <;>f the defendant's bus
when it stopped on the .:b:ighway tq. pick up a. passeng~r.
The court~ denying plaintiffs right to recover, said:

CCA driver is charged with the duty of taking care
and caution· in the operation of his vehicle commensurate to the known· and obvious danger. It. was the
plaiptiff' s own want. of care, plus the icy condition· of
the highway, which. was _the sole proximate cause o~
the accident:'
.
.

· Likewise -in the case of Conrey vs .. Abr:amson, 29.4 Mass.
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431, .2 N .E. 2d 203, the court in sustaining a directed verdict
for the defendant in a suit brought by the plaintiff to. recover
" for injuries resulting when a car in which plaintiff was a passenger collided with the rear of a. second car which stopp~d
suddenly because defendant's car in front of it suddenly stopped, said:
"Defendant was not bound to anticipate that after
he had come to a stop, and another automobile had
stopped behind him, a third automobile would strike
the second and a passenger in the third would be in~
jured. The evidence was not sufficient to warrant a
finding that the negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries."
The temporary stopping on the proper· side of a highway .
for a necessary purpose is not negligence. Winter vs. Davis,
-217 Iowa 424, 251 N. W. 770; 42 C. J. para. 13, page 613.
The court's attention is respectfully invited to Estes vs.
Slater, ;, N. ·Y. Supp. 2d 287, 18 N. E. 2d 690. In this case
a Judgment for the plaintiff·· was affirmed where plaintiff had
stopped his car to give his name to another motorist against
whose car he had collided, and while so doing, his car was
struck in the:-re~r by the defendant's car which was proceeding
in the same line of traffic on the highway.

the

foregoing prin~iples to the i~stant case, it
Applying
is difficult to ,Herceive how the. trial court could conclude that
the plaintiff Insurance Company was not entitled to judgment
as a matter of. iaw. ·What acts of the plaintiff's insured
could .be said to. have c9ntributed to the· .damag.es sustained
to his automob~le? . He .acted as any reasonably prudent person
10
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would have done under the peculiar circumstances of the
situation. He stopped his car directly behind and in line of
the other automobiles awaiting traffic on the highway to clear.
l-Ie was on his own proper side of the highway and was off
to the right as far as he could safely be. The automobile of
George Arn1our stopped behind the Insurance Company's insured without incident and- apparently without any difficulty.
Then the defendant, approaching from the rear, collided with
Armour's car and in turn ~rith that of the Insurance Company's
insured. The trial court concluded that plaintiff's insured
was negligent in failing to get out- of his automobile and warn
other motorists who might be approaching from the rear of
a situation on the highway which anr motorist could see or
should have been able to see. We respectfully -submit that
the trial court erred in this respect and that as a matter of
law, it (:annot be said that plaintiff Insurance Company's in~ured was neglisent under these circumstances.

POINT II
It is the contention of the Insurance Company that the
trial court erred in making and entering a Finding of Fact
to the effect that its insured was contributorily negligent in
stopping his automobile in the lane of traffic and in not moving off onto the shoulder of the roadway. (Finding-- of Pact
No.. ~-R. 29). We respectfully submit. that th~ rec~rd ts
absolutely without evidence to support such a finding.
.

-

The Court's attention is invited to those. po.r~ions of the
record wherein testimony of witnesses ~oncernin$ ~his_ ·question
11
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is set forth. We shall first consider the testimony of witness
Mark Lewis, the defendant, on direct examination (Tr. 4):
By Mr. Bayle: ''Did you collide with any cars on the
highway at that time?
A. Mr. Park's.

Q., Would you explain how that happened, please?
A. Well, I was going to Geneva and was just driving
along and this car in head of me pulled off, a car
pulled off in front of me, and there was a car stopped in front of him and I couldn't get off the road
because it was too slippery, and I couldn't turn
off to the ·left because cars coming from Geneva
and if I turned I hit into them, so all I could do
was let her go."
The defendant then testified rather -yaguely on cross exr
amination as follows (Tr. 7):
.By Mr. Merrill: ctDo you have any idea as to the
width of the shoulders on that morning·?
A. Well, just plenty room off the shoulder for an- other car.
Q. Were the shoulders cleared of snow? ·
A. No. There was snow on it.
Q. How many inches of snow were on the sho~lders?

A. Gosh, I don't know.''
Again on· cross examination, the defendant said (Tr. 7
and 8)':

By Mr~ Merrill: CtHow many cars were ahead of you?
. \Vhen=·you were proceeding north Oll the highway?
12
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A. When I \vas driving along?
Q. Yes. Prior to the accident.

A. One.
Q. Which way

~rere

you going?

.A. North.
Q. Could you see any cars ahead of him stopped- or
parked at that time?
A. No.

Q. Did he make a sudden turn to get off the highway?

MR. BAYLE: Just a moment.. Which are you speaking
·
of, Mr. Park's car?
1'fR. MERRILL: No. The car in head of Lewis.

MR. BAYLE: I don't think that's material, Your Honor.
(Argument).

THE COURT: He may answer.

A. Oh, not too fast.
Q. Did he slow up any?

A. Yes, when he got on the shoulder- he slowed right
up.
Q. Did he give you any time to stop.
A. No.

Q. Then what happened to your car after you hit him_?
A. Sides,viped him, and ran into the back of Park's car_.

On cross e:xamination, the Insurance Company's insured,
Mr. Park, testified concerning the posi~ion of his _automobile
upon the roadway· as follows (Tr~ 14 and 15): 13~
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Br. Mr. Merrill: ccHow wide were the shoulders
tnere, Mr. Park?
A. Shoulders?

Q. Yes. Where you parked.
A. From the cement out?

Q. Yes.
A. Well, I wouldn't know. There was a slope from
the pavement off to the side. That's all I remember.
.Q. Was it possible for you to pull your car over to the
shoulder from the place you were parked at?
A. Over to the shoulder ?
Q. Yes, to get off the highway?
A. Shoulder runs right up to the highway, you mean?
.

-

,.

· Q. Well, could you have pulled off the highway from
the place you were parked at?
A. How far off the highway?

Q. Well, so that the traffic could proceed. along the
highway?
~A .. North?

Q. Yes.
A. Well, I don't know. I don't know if it was gone
off to the side or not. It was covered with snow.
Q. You didn~t make any effort to .pull your car off the
highway, did you ?

A. I stopped_ right

be~ind the ro~

of cars.

Q. That was.on.the main portion .of .the .travelled road
-

there, wasn't it? You were still on the highway
when you parked, were you not?
·
·
14
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A. With two wheels.
Q. What?

A. With two wheels.
Q. How far from the center line of the highway were
you from on your right-hand side?

A. Oh, probably eight feet.
Q. Was it possible to go around you, where you were
parked there ?

A. They

~vouldn' t

let them go around there."

Witness Kenneth W. Park testified as follows
the east shoulder of the highway (Tr. 20) :
.

con~ern_it?-g

'

By Mr. Bayle: (tDo you ~em em bet, with reference to
the right edge of the highway, where your father's
automobile was prior to the impact? ·
A. Vaguely.
Q. And where was it?

A. It was pulled off to ·the right- as far as he could get,
due to the fact there was quite deep snow off to
the side of the highway.".
This same witness, on

cross~

examination, said (Tr. 21

and 22):

By Mr. Merrill: "Whereabouts was your father's car,
with reference to the center line of the highway?
A. That would be quite impossible to tell. There was
snow covering the ~enter line.
Q. When he was parked, wasn't he parked. on the
main portion. of tl)e highway, going north?
1)
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A. Partially.
Q. How do you mean partially?

A. He was off to the right as far as he could go.

Q. How deep was the snow on the shoulders?
A. I'd say close to a foot.
Q. Was there any other cars further off the shoulders
in back of you, or in front of you ?

A. All about the same. They were in line."
Witness Guy P. Lewis, called on behalf of the defense,
said (Tr~ 25):
By Mr. Merrill: CCHow were the shoulders? On the
right-hand side?
A. Oh, it was about two or three inches of snow on
them."
Mr. Guy Lewis said on c;-oss examination (Tr. 25 and 26):
By Mr. Bayle: ((When· did you first see these automobiles ahead ·of you?
A. When the man that was in front of us pulled off
to the side of the road.
Q. He pulled off to the rear of those cars?

A. Yes.
.

Q. And Mr .. Lewis' automobile started to skid then,
. I
d1.dn ,t tt..

A·. Yes, sir.
Q. It was out of control, ·wasn't it?

A. No; it wasn't.
skidded.

He put on the

~rakes

and he just

16
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Q. Did he go straight forward?
A. Straight forward, yes, sir.

Q. I think you said he struck the car directly ahead of
him?
A. Yes, sir, the car that pulled off the side
on the left --Side.

of the ro€J.d,

Q. 1-Iit that on the left side?
A. Yes.

Q. Did he pass the left side of that car?
A. Yes.

Q. And did he strike any other cars ?
A. Yes, he struck one that was parked tn the road
ahead of him.

Q. It was in line with other cars, wasn't it?
A. Yes."
We have ~etailed the evidence in respect to this question.
so as to make clear the basis for . our contention that
the trial
.
court erred in making such a finding of fact and thereby concluding that the Insurance Company's insured was negligent.
We respectfully_ submit that there is not the slightest evidence
available in the record to support such a conclusion and we
respectfully submit that the trial court was in error in this
resp~~-t.

POINT III
Passing to \vhat we considered the third point of error,
we take the position that the trial court's judgment, of no

17
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cause of action, is unsupported by the evidence and contrary
tc law. A thorough and careful perusal of the evidence fails
to justify a conclusion that the Insurance Company's insured
was guilty of acts "'hich in any way contributed to the resulting
c01lision. He ac~ed as only he could under the circumstances,
and certainly as any other reasonably prudent person would
have been obliged to act. The sole proximate cause of this
collision and the resulting damages to the automobile of the
Insurance Company's insured was the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep a proper lookout for conditions existing on
the highway, and in driving too fast for those existing conditions.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that each of the points of error
is well taken and should be sustained, and that the judgment
of the trial court should be reversed with direction to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff Insurance Company for
the amount of the prayer in its complaint, with costs.
Respectfully .submitted,

F. ROBERT BAYLE,

Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellflnt
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